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A Tale of Two Cases
Paul J. Larkin, Jr. ∗
“It was the best of times, it was the worst of times . . . .” So
began Charles Dickens’s A Tale of Two Cities. Public interest
lawyers might use the same line to open a discussion of two
decisions rendered on the same day in the summer of 2015.
One case was Obergefell v. Hodges, 1 a five-to-four ruling by
the Supreme Court of the United States that the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause entitles same-sex couples to
equal treatment with opposite-sex couples for purposes of
“marriage.” 2 The Court acknowledged that Anglo-American law
had historically limited marriage to heterosexual couples, but did
not find itself bound by that tradition. 3 Instead, the Court
recognized a constitutional right to gay marriage on several
policy-oriented grounds: civilization has always valued the
institution of marriage, that union serves noble purposes that gay
couples can also promote, gay marriages cannot injure the
* Senior Legal Research Fellow, The Heritage Foundation; M.P.P. George
Washington University; J.D. Stanford Law School, 1980; B.A. Washington &
Lee University, 1977. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own
and should not be construed as representing any official position of the Heritage
Foundation.
1. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). Obergefell was the fourth in a series of cases
dealing with constitutional protection for gays. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620, 635 (1996) (holding unconstitutional a state constitutional provision
foreclosing local regulation of sexual orientation-based discrimination);
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (holding unconstitutional a
statute making it a crime for members of the same sex to engage in in-home
sexual conduct); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695–96 (2013)
(holding unconstitutional a federal statute limiting the definition of “marriage”
to heterosexual couples).
2. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608 (noting that the Constitution
guarantees same-sex couples “equal dignity in the eyes of the law” for the
purposes of marriage).
3. See id. at 2606 (discussing the Court’s previous holdings limiting this
definition and reasoning that, because those holdings violated the Fourteenth
Amendment and were overturned, a contrary finding in this instance would lead
to unconstitutional injury to same-sex couples).
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institution of marriage or infringe on the rights of individual
heterosexual couples, and a law excepting gay marriages from
official legal recognition “demeans” and “stigma[tizes]” gays and
lesbians. 4 The Court left undecided how the law should treat
those groups in other settings. 5
The second case is Patel v. Texas Department of Licensing
and Regulation. 6 Not surprisingly, Patel has received far less
attention than Obergefell. Patel, a narrowly-divided ruling by the
Supreme Court of Texas, involved the constitutionality of a state
law imposing a hefty educational requirement on “commercial
eyebrow threaders”—people who use cotton twine wrapped
around two fingers to remove loose eyebrow hair. 7 Texas law
licenses threading as a form of “cosmetology” and requires a
minimum of 750 hours of instruction in various topics, many of
which—such as “anatomy and physiology”; “electricity, machines,
and related equipment”; “chemistry”; “nutrition”; and “color
psychology”—seem irrelevant to any health or safety concern
with threading itself. 8 Nonetheless, if precedent were the guide,
Patel’s claim that the licensing scheme was irrational would have
gone down in flames. Historically, parties challenging
occupational licensing schemes have not fared well in court. 9 The
Patel case, however, turned out differently than most. Also
refusing to be bound by history and relying on a provision in the
Texas constitution analogous to the Due Process Clause, 10 the
4. See id. at 2597–605 (discussing the Court’s policy arguments justifying
the right of same-sex couples to marry on several grounds and asserting that
such a law excepting that privilege would “demean” and “stigmatize” them).
5. See id. at 2606 (“It is of no moment whether advocates of same-sex
marriage now enjoy or lack momentum in the democratic process. The issue
before the Court here is the legal question whether the Constitution protects the
right of same-sex couples to marry.”).
6. 469 S.W.3d 69 (Tex. 2015).
7. See id. at 91–92 (holding that provisions relating to the 750 hour
training requirement imposed on commercial eyebrow threaders in order to
receive state licensing violated the Texas state constitution).
8. Id. at 87–88. In fact, the state conceded that more than 40% of the
required instructional hours were unrelated to threading. Id. at 89.
9. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Public Choice Theory and Occupational
Licensing, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 209, 277–80 (2016) (discussing the history
of unfavorable dispositions of various occupational licensing statutes).
10. TEX. CONST. art I, § 19.
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Texas Supreme Court held that the 750-hour licensing
requirement was “oppressive” 11 and therefore unconstitutional. 12
A wag might say that Obergefell and Patel are evil twins, and
the cases do share some obvious similarities. Each case involved a
disputed issue of contemporary public policy; 13 each outcome was
decided by a one-vote margin; each decision relied on one of the
more open-ended provisions in the respective federal and state
constitutions; each court did not feel itself bound by history; and
each court intervened when it concluded that legislation went too
far and became either demeaning (Obergefell) or oppressive
(Patel). 14 But there is one common aspect to the decisions that is
far more important than any of the others, and it concerns what
each court did not say: Where do we go from here?
The late Professor John Ely began his trenchant criticism of
Roe v. Wade 15 by pointing out that abortion was a curious place
for the Supreme Court to take on the burden of reconciling
11. See Patel, 469 S.W.3d at 91 (holding that the occupational licensing
statute at issue was unconstitutional). The principal dissent complained that
the term “oppressive” is “a brand-new entrant in the substantive due process
lexicon.” Id. at 125–26 (Hecht, C.J., dissenting). That criticism is not persuasive.
See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) (plurality
opinion) (adopting an “undue burden” test to evaluate state restrictions on
abortion).
12. See Patel v. Tex. Dep’t of Licensing and Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69, 89
(Tex. 2015) (relying on Article I, § 19 of the Texas Constitution, the “Due Course
of Law” provision, which states “no citizen of this State shall be deprived of life,
liberty, property, privileges or immunities, or in any manner disfranchised,
except by the due course of the law of the land”). States may afford individuals
greater rights under their state constitutions than they have under the federal
Constitution. See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the
Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
13. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597–606 (2015) (analyzing
various public policy arguments and justifications for and against the
incorporation of same-sex unions into the definition of marriage); Patel, 469
S.W.3d 69, 74 (discussing the benefits and burdens of maintaining occupational
licensing statutes as a matter of public policy).
14. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2590 (“It is demeaning to lock same-sex
couples out of a central institution of the Nation’s society, for they too may
aspire to the transcendent purposes of marriage.”); Patel, 469 S.W.3d at 90–91
(“[T]he Threaders have met their high burden of proving that . . . the
requirement of 750 hours of training to become licensed is . . . so oppressive that
it violates Article 1, § 19 of the Texas Constitution.”).
15. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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constitutional
law
with
social
mores. 16
Unlike
the
constitutionality of laws prohibiting homosexual acts between
consenting adults, he explained, the abortion issue involves more
than simply a woman’s interests in bodily integrity or personal
freedom. 17 “Abortion ends (or if it makes a difference, prevents)
the life of the human being other than the one making the
choice,” and the Court’s response to the state’s interest in
protecting that life, Ely concluded, “is simply not adequate.” 18
Roe’s sterile conclusion that historically speaking “the unborn
have never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole
sense” 19 had never been a requirement for government to prohibit
conduct it deemed harmful or immoral. “Dogs are not ‘persons in
the whole sense’ nor have they constitutional rights, but that
does not mean the state cannot prohibit killing them.” 20 Ely
concluded that the moral issue involved in abortion was a
difficult one to resolve, but that the constitutional issue was not,
because the document was entirely silent on that subject. 21 The
result was that, to him, the Justices had crossed the divide
separating ethicists from jurists. 22
16. See John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v.
Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 923 (1973) (“But even assuming it would be a good idea
for the Court to assume this function [to ‘second-guess legislative balances’], Roe
seems a curious place to have begun.”).
17. See id. at 924 (arguing that the risks presented by the abortion issue
are greater than the “stunting” of affected lifestyles that is at stake in
legislation such as the anti-homosexual prohibitions).
18. Id.
19. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162; see id. at 156–62 (discussing the Court’s reasons
for concluding that the unborn have not traditionally been recognized as whole
persons in a legal sense).
20. Ely, supra note 16, at 925.
21. See id. at 935 (“What is frightening about Roe is that this
super-protected right is not inferable from the language of the
Constitution . . . never before has [the Court’s] sense of an obligation to draw [a
value from the Constitution] been so obviously lacking.”).
22. See id. at 926 (asserting that it is not the Court’s business to secondguess legislative balances, and even if it was, Roe would have been “a strange
case with which to begin”). And that conclusion came from someone who would
have voted for the Court’s trimester system were he a legislator. See id. (“Were I
a legislator I would vote for a statute very much like the one the Court ends up
drafting.”).
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Given Roe, Obergefell should have been as easy to resolve as
Ely assumed. Roe held that a state’s interest in protecting a specific
human life is not sufficient to outweigh a woman’s liberty interest in
ending her pregnancy. 23 The state’s interest in Obergefell—
protecting public morality—was more diffuse and less weighty that
the one found insufficient in Roe. Atop that, the Supreme Court had
previously required people to ignore perceived immoral conduct that
did not personally injure them.24 Accordingly, if the liberty issue at
stake in Obergefell was anything more than trivial, the balance
should have readily swung in favor of gay marriage. Same sex
marriage may offend public sensibilities, but it does not terminate
anyone’s life. The Roe balancing approach 25 therefore should have
made deciding Obergefell a snap.
But it was not—and for a good reason. To many, the Court’s
analysis in Roe v. Wade was precisely the type of interest-balancing
approach 26 that the Court had previously invoked in cases such as
Lochner v. New York 27 to strike down social and economic legislation
that the Court found unreasonable. Since the New Deal Era,
however, the Court had largely treated Lochner like the plague. The
Court had either strolled28 or sprinted 29 away from constitutional
23. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162–64 (1973) (noting that while a state
has a legitimate state interest in protecting potential life that grows in
importance with the length of the pregnancy, “the ‘compelling’ point is at
viability,” and as such, that interest does not outweigh a woman’s liberty
interest before that point).
24. See Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 211 (1975) (holding that a
town may not prohibit a drive-in theater from showing a movie involving nudity
simply to avoid offending the sensibilities of passers-by because viewers can
“avert[] their eyes” (citations and internal punctuation omitted)); see generally
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
25. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152, 154 (“It is with these interests . . . that this
case is concerned . . . . We, therefore, conclude that the right of personal privacy
includes the abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified and must be
considered against important state interests in regulation.”).
26. See id. (describing the Roe balancing approach).
27. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
28. See generally, Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (upholding 5-4
a state order setting milk prices); W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937) (upholding 5-4 a state minimum wage law).
29. See generally Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955)
(upholding 8–0 a state law prohibiting non-optometrists from filling eyeglass
prescriptions); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) (upholding 9–0 a state

472

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 467 (2016)

interest-balancing, making clear that legislature is the proper
forum for any balancing that must be done. Yet, Roe v. Wade
boldly signaled that the Court had returned to its old ways, and
therefore raised a serious question to what extent substantive
due process had been reborn.
What followed was a sophisticated, intense, heated, and still
ongoing debate in the courts, the academy, and the legal
profession over the issues whether the Due Process Clause should
guarantee substantive rights as well as procedural fairness and,
if so, how those rights should be defined. Forests the size of
Oregon were felled as journals turned out scores of articles
proposing answers to those questions, with no end in sight. 30 The
Supreme Court, however, must decide cases, so it could not avoid
answering them forever. Ultimately, the Court endorsed a limited
form of substantive due process review, but confined it to specific,
narrowly defined interests that Anglo-American history has
always protected by law. The Court used that approach in
Washington v. Glucksberg 31 to reject the claim that a terminal
patient has a due process right to a physician’s assistance to end
his life on his own terms. 32 Glucksberg appeared to settle the
dispute over the legitimacy of substantive due process (at least
for those Justices) and to provide a standard to resolve future
claims, a standard that relied on history and tradition. 33 That
compromise outcome fully satisfied neither side of the debate, but
at least it gave the courts a relatively objective test that was an
improvement over Roe’s unguided interest-balancing. 34

law limiting debt adjustment to lawyers).
30. See generally ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE (Steven G.
Calabresi ed., 2007).
31. 521 U.S. 702, 724–25 (1997).
32. See id. (noting that the law was subject to rational basis scrutiny and
passed the test on grounds that multiple asserted state interests were
“unquestionably important and legitimate”).
33. See id. at 722–723 (discussing the limitations of the applicability of the
“substantive due-process” line of cases and offering a standard of analysis
mirroring the rational basis tests used in equal protection cases).
34. See id. (discussing the objective application of the rational basis
standard).
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If the courts had followed the Glucksberg approach in
Obergefell and Patel, deciding those cases might have been as
easy as Ely surmised—although the results would not have been
entirely what he expected. Neither English common law, nor its
American descendant, nor, until recently, the judgments of state
legislatures had treated same-sex and opposite-sex couples as
equals for purposes of marriage, as the Obergefell majority
readily admitted. 35 If history were dispositive, or even just
presumptively so, any constitutional right to gay marriage would
have been doomed. By contrast, the common law—and even the
Constitution itself—says a great deal about property. AngloAmerican common law displayed a strong concern for the
protection of private property and the right to pursue a lawful
occupation. 36 Indeed, because the Framers’ generation saw
“property” and “liberty” as one inseparable concept, 37 it is not
surprising that the Constitution and Bill of Rights contain
several specific property rights protections. 38 Thus, if history
35. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594 (2015) (“Marriage, in
[the respondents’] view, is by its nature a gender-differentiated union of man
and woman. This view has long been held—and continues to be held—in good
faith by reasonable and sincere people here and throughout the world.”).
36. See Larkin, supra note 9, at 66–68 (discussing cases that have
protected the rights of private property and pursuit of lawful occupations).
37. See, e.g., EDMUND S. MORGAN, THE CHALLENGE OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 55 (1978) (“Property and liberty were one and inseparable.”); JOHN
PHILIP REID, THE CONCEPT OF LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
32–33 (1988) (discussing the defining line between “liberty” and “licentiousness”
in the discussion of liberty and property); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787 219 (1998) (discussing the historical
tradition of combining the property and liberty concepts); Laura S.
Underkuffler, On Property: An Essay, 100 YALE. L.J. 127, 129 (1990) (“[P]roperty
included not only external objects and people's relationships to them, but also
all of those human rights, liberties, powers, and immunities that are important
for human well-being.”). That attitude was still vibrant when the Fourteenth
Amendment became law. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, The Political Economy
of Substantive Due Process, 40 STAN. L. REV. 379, 393 (1988) (discussing the
development of the substantive due process doctrine within the Fourteenth
Amendment, and its foundation in historic American ideals of liberty and
property rights, and the process they are afforded).
38. See, e.g., Larkin, supra note 9, at 256–76 (exploring various
constitutional protections for property rights). Even the Supreme Court agreed.
See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (“Without doubt, [liberty]
denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the
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carried the weight for substantive due process decision-making,
Patel would have been another easy case. Yet, the majority did
not classify economic opportunity as a “fundamental right” under
the Texas Constitution, 39 and the four-to-three vote indicates that
the judges found the correct outcome a very close call.
Where do those cases leave us? How far does substantive due
process reach? If history and tradition are not the guidepost for
answering that question, what is? The unfortunate truth is that
we do not yet know. There are some alternatives. I will discuss
only two.
A traditional justification for heightened judicial scrutiny is
that the political branches are biased against a particular group.
The Supreme Court first adumbrated that theory in the famous
Carolene Products footnote four 40 and appeared to endorse it
decades later. 41 If the Supreme Court were to adopt that
approach now, rulings like Patel would become far more common.
Public Choice Theory42 explains how and why politicians can and
will generate economic rents for particular interest groups at the
expense of the general welfare, a criticism that has always been
leveled against occupational licensing requirements. 43 As Robert
McCloskey once put it, there is no more impotent a minority than
an assortment of “scattered individuals who are denied access to
individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life . . . .”).
39. See Patel v. Tex. Dep’t of Licensing and Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69, 87–
88 (2015) (concluding that the rational basis and legitimate state interest tests
for evaluation would control challenges to economic regulations on the grounds
of a denial of due process, precluding higher scrutiny for a “fundamental right”).
40. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)
(suggesting that “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a
special condition” justifying heightened judicial review).
41. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28
(1973) (the “traditional indicia of suspectness” are that a class is “saddled with
such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment,
or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process”).
42. See, e.g., Larkin, supra note 9, at 19–28 (explaining the origin and
definition of Public Choice Theory and its role in political discussions).
43. See, e.g., Larkin, supra note 9, at 213–15, 235–44 (discussing the
tendency of occupational licensing statutes to promote the economic aspirations
of political interest groups, often to the detriment of the public or general
welfare).
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an occupation by State-enforced barriers.” 44 Ironically, however,
under that approach, rulings like Obergefell would become far
less common. The legislative victories recently won by gays and
lesbians prove that they are no longer a politically powerless
group, and therefore are no longer in need of special protection by
the courts. 45
An alternative approach would focus on the relative
importance of an interest to the affected individuals. Before
Obergefell, the Supreme Court had rejected that theory, 46 but the
lower courts might read Obergefell as making the importance of
an alleged right the critical factor in deciding whether
substantive due process protects it. If that were to become the
approach, there certainly will be more decisions like Patel. It
would be elitist to claim that “liberty” rights are more important
than “property” rights on the ground that “[a]t the heart of liberty
is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning,
of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.” 47 After all, life
has little meaning for someone who cannot afford its basic
necessities. Without protection for the right to earn the money
necessary to enjoy the rights that the Court has created, those
rights are not worth much; just ask an unemployed and homeless
gay couple. As a simple matter of biology, therefore, it is difficult
to see how any interest could be more important than pursuing a
line of work that enables someone to feed, clothe, and shelter
himself and his family. 48 Yet, here, too, if the importance of a
44. Robert McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An
Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 34, 50.
45. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing the chain of recent
Supreme Court rulings granting increased rights to gay and lesbian citizens).
46. See San Antonio, 411 U.S. at 33 (discounting the notion that
discovering whether education was a “fundamental” right should be considered
based on “comparisons of the relative societal significance of education as
opposed to subsistence or housing”).
47. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). The
additional belief that “[m]arriage responds to the universal fear that a lonely
person might call out only to find no one there,” Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600, is
also not a weighty factor. It’s just a Motown song. The Four Tops, Reach Out I’ll
Be There, YOUTUBE (1966), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KnDm3qr1Knk.
48. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (“The
administration of public welfare assistance, by contrast, involves the most basic
economic needs of impoverished human beings.”); Leonard W. Levy, Property as
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right is what determines whether due process grants it, there
would be fewer cases like Obergefell. Given the paeans that the
Supreme Court wrote about the importance of marriage, 49 the
Court would be hard pressed to find another interest equally as
weighty without abandoning any pretense of judicial objectivity.
In sum, Obergefell and Patel each held that substantive due
process is a legitimate ground for upsetting a considered
legislative judgment, whether that judgment has deep roots in
Anglo-American legal, political, and social history, or is a child of
the New Deal. Both decisions refused to rely on history and
tradition as the measure of substantive due process in favor of
using the very sort of interest-balancing that the Supreme Court
used in Lochner and Roe and later abandoned. And neither that
court nor the Texas Supreme Court explained what would be an
unconstitutional restriction in other circumstances. The bottom
line is this: Unless those courts intended their decisions to serve
only as “a restricted railroad ticket, good for this day and train
only,” 50 they owed us an answer to where we go from here, and
we did not get it in those opinions.
Who knows, maybe Lochner will turn out to be more phoenix
than corpse.

a Human Right, 5 CONST. COMMENTARY 169, 183 (1988) (“Making a living is
fundamental to one's personhood and stake in society. Free speech is of little
value to a propertyless person. With the exception of freedom of religion,
nothing is more important than work and a chance at a career or a decent
living.”).
49. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (describing the Supreme
Court’s discussion of the importance of marriage in its Obergefell holding).
50. Smith v. Albright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting).

